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ABSTRACT
Administrative burden is widely recognized as a barrier to program enrollment, denying legal
entitlements to many eligible individuals. We examine what effect voluntary state reductions in
administrative burden (what we call administrative easing) have had on Medicaid enrollment
rates using differential implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Using a novel dataset that
includes state-level data on simplified enrollment and renewal procedures for Medicaid from
2008-2017, we examine how change in Medicaid enrollment is conditioned by the adoption of
rule-reduction procedures. We find that reductions in the administrative burden required to signup for Medicaid were associated with increased enrollments. Real-time eligibility and reductions
in enrollment burden were particularly impactful at increasing enrollment for both children and
adults separate from increases in Medicaid income eligibility thresholds. The results suggest that
efforts to ease the cognitive burden of enrolling in entitlement programs can improve take-up.
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Evidence for Practice
•

The administrative burden associated with enrolling in social safety-net programs in the
U.S. imposes high costs on applicants. As a consequence, many potentially eligible
individuals do not receive the benefits that they are lawfully entitled to.

•

Insights from behavioral economics including streamlining of the enrollment process and
automated benefit determinations can be effectively employed—in some cases—to
reduce the cognitive burden associated with program enrollment processes and have the
potential to increase take-up of benefits.

•

States that have implemented simple changes to enrollment processes including
administrative verification of income and real-time decision-making have seen greater
increases in Medicaid enrollments compared to those that did not implement these
changes.
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Introduction
A growing body of research treats seriously the role of administrative burdens in
simultaneously shaping citizen uptake of important government programs and services as well as
citizen’s direct and indirect experiences with government institutions themselves (e.g., Heinrich
2016; Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey 2015). Some level of administrative burden occurs whenever
individuals initiate transactions with the state, public organizations, and their administrative
agents (as in the case of social service take-up) or, conversely, when states, public organizations,
and their administrative agents transact with individuals (as in the case of law enforcement)
(Heinrich 2016: 404-405). Most administrative burdens arise from the significant encumbrances
experienced by individuals along four dimensions, including (1) the role formal rules play in
producing compliance burdens for those who interact with the state, (2) how bureaucratic
discretion shapes client outcomes (both positively and negatively), (3) the function of upfront
learning costs assumed in determining individuals’ willingness to persist in their transactions
with the state, and (4) the psychological and social costs of client stigma and stigmatization
(Moynihan et al. 2015).
Although some measure of administrative burden will be experienced in any transaction
with the state, administrative burdens and their consequences are particularly pronounced in
social service settings, where it is especially important for government to ensure program
eligibility requirements and restrictions are met (Moynihan et al. 2015). In such cases, the weight
of the administrative burden experienced by citizens and service recipients can have a “material
influence” on outcomes such as service uptake (Moynihan et al. 2015). Yet, despite the
considerable progress made in this area, several key issues remain unexplored. For instance, how
do client characteristics affect their interpretations of administrative burden? What drives
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decisions to craft and structure administrative burdens in particular ways? And what can states
do to lower burdens for citizens? In this paper, we attempt to begin addressing some of these
open issues by exploring how state efforts to simplify certain social welfare policy rules (i.e.,
reduce/ease one form of administrative burden) influence participant enrollment and renewal
rates.
Next, we describe the policy background of our study before turning to theory and the
complex interactions between administrative burden, the social construction of target groups, the
exercise of bureaucratic discretion, and their implications for social safety-net participation.
Later, we turn to a discussion of our data and analysis, results, and conclusions. We find that
enrollment rule-easing, improvements in the “digital choice architecture,” and real-time
eligibility were most strongly associated with an increase in program enrollment even adjusting
for the Medicaid expansion (i.e., changes in income eligibility thresholds in states).

Background
U.S. social welfare policy is susceptible to high levels of administrative burden as it is
governed by a labyrinthine set of rules that define program eligibility, enrollment procedures,
and the cash-value of benefits received. Beyond the already onerous demands imposed by federal
requirements, the delegation of the administration of many US safety-net programs to the states
creates another layer of complication in the degree of administrative burden required to enroll in
these programs as rules vary across states. Moreover, no central database exists capturing all
program rules and their interactions, meaning there is presently no easy mechanism for citizens
to check their eligibility for public assistance without undergoing rigorous scrutiny and
submitting large amounts of paperwork.
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Administrative burdens of the sort described above represent a significant barrier to
safety-net program enrollment, tacitly denying benefits to many potentially eligible individuals.
Consequently, estimates suggest that, for every 100 families in poverty in 2015, only 23 received
cash assistance from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program (Floyd,
Pavetti, and Schott 2017). Likewise, over 3.7 million children were found to be eligible for
Medicaid or state Children’s Health Insurance Programs (CHIP) but were uninsured in 2012
(Kenney et al. 2015). Seemingly minor variations in enrollment and renewal policies such as 12month continuous coverage, simplified asset verification, no face-to-face interview requirement,
joint applications for programs with the same information verification, and presumptive or
express lane eligibility procedures can vastly simplify program enrollment and renewal
processes, easing the administrative burden experienced by citizens (Kaiser Family Foundation
2009). However, while states can streamline enrollment procedures in-line with behaviorallyinformed enrollment and renewal procedures in their Medicaid and CHIP programs, the extent to
which they have exercised these options varies widely.
To remedy this situation, the federal government has periodically utilized policies, many
of which are behaviorally-informed, to try to incentivize states to increase their enrollments in
programs such as Medicaid. For instance, in 2009, the CHIP reauthorization law (known as
CHIPRA) included a “performance bonus” that provided extra financial support to states that
succeeded in enrolling Medicaid-eligible children above target levels (Kaiser Family Foundation
2009). To qualify for the bonus, states needed to implement at least five of eight policies
designed to streamline enrollment and renewal procedures in their Medicaid and CHIP programs.
Previous research has shown that reductions in administrative burdens make it possible to
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increase program take-up while maintaining program integrity by shifting administrative burdens
from the citizen to the state (Herd et al. 2013; Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; Ross et al. 2009).
In the case of state welfare policy, we argue that administrative burden should not be
viewed as a set of “benign” rules that have gradually evolved to become onerous over time (as
red tape is sometimes described) (Bozeman 1993). Rather, we argue along with Herd and
Moynihan (2018), that the corpus of rules that have evolved make it exceedingly difficult for
citizens to determine their program eligibility, and that this is consequential both in its impacts
on program participation as well as citizen’s experiences with the state. To examine this claim,
we test the effects of states’ choices to purposively either add or relax rules that create or
diminish barriers to entry to social programs.
We test this proposition with a novel dataset that includes time-series repeat cross-section
data on simplified enrollment and renewal procedures for Medicaid and CHIP across all 50 states
between 2008-2017 (Anonymous. 2016). We examine whether rule simplifications predict
program participation rates over time by combining available program rules data with
information on monthly enrollments in Medicaid. We adjust for state ideology, and state fiscal
status, which may be correlated with policy adoptions in states. Findings can be used to inform
current efforts to use the principles of behavioral economics to ease the cognitive burden of
enrollment in other social programs and in state efforts to expand Medicaid (Blavin, Dorn, and
Dev 2014). Simply, we are able to demonstrate how the scope of administrative burden
influences program uptake and participation. Finally, our analysis also provides evidence of the
effectiveness of the federal government at “nudging” states to change their behavior.

Theory
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Extant literature argues that administrative burdens are the product of administrative and
political choices (Herd and Moynihan 2018). In this view, the state constructs administrative
burden via policy design with political ideology leading politicians to use burdens to make
government a source of hindrance. In contrast with programs like Medicare and Social Security,
that are designed as universal trust-fund programs, tend to have a high-degree of popularity and
are often referred to as the “third rail” in American politics due to their “untouchable” status,
other welfare programs have been designed as means-tested, categorical eligibility programs
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Means-tested programs foster social divisions by construing welfare as
entitlement programs for free-riding client-recipients who take benefits without meaningfully
paying into the system.
Likewise, research in public policy has suggested that targeted benefits (as opposed to
universal benefits that are open to all) affects individuals’ feelings of self-worth and social
efficacy. The social construction of target population theory suggests that the cultural
characterizations or popular images of persons or groups as portrayed through symbolic
language, metaphors, and stories affects how these groups are treated in the policy process
(Schneider and Ingram 1993). Researchers have found that negatively constructed “target
groups” result in those groups becoming more marginalized and less active in politics (Soss
1999; Mettler and Soss 2004). In this view, the goal of social welfare policy is to discourage the
use of social services in all but the most extreme cases rather than to meet the needs of the poor
and vulnerable.
The design of US social welfare policy with its complex, burdensome set of categorical
eligibility rules has tended to reinforce the view of safety-net programs as a stigmatizing option
of last resort. In fact, there is ample evidence that welfare systems have been designed in a
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manner that tends to favor shaming and discouragement of benefit usage. Eubanks (2018), for
instance, describes 19th century itinerants as being quarantined in county poorhouses. In the
20th century, intrusive investigations by caseworkers have served to dampen program
participation as all but the neediest may be discouraged from undergoing such invasive scrutiny
(Eubanks 2018). Welfare reform in the 1990s added onerous requirements to qualify for basic
income assistance that had ripple effects in provisos for other social assistance programs.
Furthermore, the political foundations of such burdens can be amplified or diminished by
administrative actors (Herd and Moynihan 2018). When viewed through the lenses of street-level
and representative bureaucracy theories, administrative rules often act as a double-edged sword
with discretion either being abused so as to exclude those who might nominally be eligible for
services or as a form of positive discrimination to assist those who would otherwise be locked
out. One can imagine two ideal-types of case workers—a jaded, cynical case worker who views
most clients as trying to game the system on the one hand or an activist case worker that views
the system as exclusionary and tries to advocate for clients on the other hand. Even when
reviewing the same case, the former might use discretion to exclude an eligible client on
permissible technical grounds whereas the latter might try to navigate the rules to maximize
eligibility and benefits for a client.
To minimize such discretion, some organizations have developed a strict ethos of rule
following that aims to incentivize rule adherence. Strict adherence to rules could be beneficial in
the case of government organizations with histories of racial inequality where rules have been
enforced restrictively or punitively to exclude eligible clients from receiving benefits (WatkinsHayes 2011). However, restrictions on discretion could also harm or eliminate the ability of case
workers to advocate for clients who are having difficulties navigating the enrollment and renewal
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processes. For instance, research on representative bureaucracy and social welfare policy
provision has found that bureaucratic environments with orientations that apply rules
restrictively or punitively often generate strong boundaries between racial minorities in
bureaucrat-client relationships (Watkins-Hayes 2011). In other words, the good intentions of
certain street level bureaucrats tends to be overwhelmed by the power of the organizational
environment when rules are strictly enforced.
The removal of discretion also has consequences for representative bureaucracy theory.
Representative bureaucracy theory suggests that when bureaucrats more closely represent the
citizens/clients they serve, they will serve those clients better and, in turn, their actions are more
likely to be perceived as legitimate (Dolan and Rosenbloom 2003). In this context, the sociodemographic profile of public organizations seems inherently entwined with the resultant
experience of citizens/clients, both generally and in terms of the degree of administrative burden
felt. Prominent work at the intersection of social policy and administration has found
“bureaucratic disentitlement” that emanates from burdens being deliberately targeted at less
powerful groups classified as “undeserving” and exercised by unsympathetic street-level
bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010). Likewise, the discretion wielded by street-level bureaucrats may also
be abused, potentially leading to ethnocentric favoritism that undermines the ideals of a rationallegal bureaucracy or that favor certain [usually advantaged] groups at the expense of others
(Lipsky 2010; Weber 1958). Therefore, the use of discretion can cut both ways in terms of its
effect on public program participation, depending partly on the disposition of individual case
workers and on the structural design of a government organization (e.g., what sorts of
organizational systems exist to encourage rule-following behavior).
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Put another way, one can imagine administration rules as generating both Type I and
Type II error. Type I error (false positive) would involve granting benefits to someone who
should have been ineligible. Type II error (false negative) would be inadvertently (or perhaps
advertently) denying benefits to someone who is actually deserving. Current rule architectures
appear to be designed more toward preventing Type I error (in other words, towards preventing
fraud). But what is less recognized is that preventing Type I error may generate more Type II
error—adding additional administrative burdens to prevent fraud can also function to exclude
those who would otherwise be eligible for benefits as well as affecting citizens overall
experience of the state.
The adoption of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 as well as certain federal efforts
that preceded the ACA in relation to the CHIP program arguably represents a major recent
turning point in social welfare policy where the aim of the reform appears to be in the direction
of increasing rather than discouraging enrollment in social welfare programs. In fact, recent
reforms have explicitly drawn upon insights from the field of behavioral economics in an attempt
to ease the cognitive strain required to enroll in social programs by, for example, increasingly
relying on electronic records to ease enrollment.
Yet, critics of these behaviorally-informed initiatives argue technology and digital
information systems have the potential to “automate” eligibility decisions in ways that deprive
needy citizens of benefits they may have otherwise gained had case workers been exercising
discretion (Eubanks 2018). Eubanks refers to the rise of these new processes for identifying
eligibility through electronic records and predictive modeling as the “digital poorhouse” and
suggests that new eligibility algorithms will remove human discretion from public services by
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transferring decision-making authority from frontline social servants and moving it instead to
engineers and data analysts thereby “automating inequality.”
We examine the cumulative effect of behaviorally-informed efforts to streamline and
ease administrative burdens in Medicaid and CHIP enrollment processes on actual enrollment in
these programs. Below, we outline the major reforms that have transformed Medicaid and CHIP
enrollment systems and how insights from behavioral economics have guided system changes.
Insights from behavioral economics as a means of reducing administrative burden.
During 2014-2017, it is estimated that over 20 million Americans gained health insurance
coverage with nearly 14.5 million insured through Medicaid. This includes many people who
had previously been eligible for Medicaid but were not enrolled, which amounts to as many as
4.9 million by some estimates (Uberoi, Finegold, and Gee 2016). Unlike its close cousin
Medicare, Medicaid has long been treated as a political afterthought and stigmatized according to
a similar logic as other means-tested, categorical eligibility programs (Brown and Sparer 2003).
Critics of Medicaid point to the fact that few providers will accept Medicaid coverage due to its
low reimbursement rates, which leads some to question the “quality” of Medicaid coverage.
Meanwhile, universal health coverage advocates call for a “Medicare for All” system despite the
fact that Medicaid is significantly more generous in terms of benefits and low cost-sharing.
However, popular perception of the program appears to be shifting with the Medicaid expansion.
A recent article has declared Medicaid the “new third rail” in American politics, a view
evidenced by the failure of recent repeal and replacement efforts (Grogan and Park 2018).
Defying stereotypes of other means-tested welfare programs, the failure of repeal and replace
efforts largely hinged on popular antipathy toward kicking people off of benefits (loss aversion)
even when expansion was not equally popular.
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The reforms to enrollment processes that enabled the expansion were largely precipitated
by insights from behavioral economics that have increasingly gained traction in mainstream and
applied policy practice (e.g., Blavin, Dorn, and Dev 2014; Chetty 2015; Bhargava and
Loewenstein 2015). Whereas the neoclassical model of economics assumes that each person has
consistent preferences over time and maximizes his or her overall well-being based on the best
available information, behavioral economics examines the ways in which human behavior
departs from the rational and objective calculation of self-interest as the basis of decisionmaking. Combining insights from economics and psychology, behavioral economics provides
new ways to think about the barriers to and drivers of health insurance take-up and coverage
(Baicker, Congdon, and Mullainathan 2012).
A primary insight from behavioral economics is the “power of default options” in the
decision-making process, which structure the “choice architecture” that often inadvertently
“nudges” individuals poorer choices in the name of protecting autonomous decision-making
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009). In the classic example employed by Thaler and Sunstein,
automatically enrolling workers in a default retirement plan unless they opt out dramatically
increased retirement savings. This type of behavioral nudge is defined as “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 6).
According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008), “nudging” people toward optimal decisionmaking (decisions that are in one’s own interest) is not only possible, but also desirable.
Individual choice can and should be steered toward better decisions as long as the capacity to
choose otherwise is preserved. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) describe this new approach as
‘libertarian paternalism’, which brings together the principles of beneficence and autonomy. A
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more comprehensive understanding of human decision-making that takes better account of how
people actually respond to the context within which their decisions are made can lead to the
identification of errors that trip people up, but also can also be used to help them make better
choices (Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp 2007).
Several insights from behavioral economics are particularly relevant to the analysis of
administrative burden and participation in public assistance programs. Two reviews of the
literature have concluded that (1) administrative barriers and consumer confusion have profound
effects on program enrollment, and (2) larger program benefits positively affect participation
(Remler and Glied 2003; Currie 2004).
The insights from behavioral economics that most directly describe the barriers to
program enrollment concern the effects of cognitive ease, procrastination, and ego depletion
(Baicker, Congdon, and Mullainathan 2012; Blavin, Dorn, and Dev 2014). Cognitive ease (or
fluency) is a measure of how easy it is for our brains to process information. The cognitive ease
associated with something will alter how we feel about it and whether we are motivated to invest
our time and effort in it. Various strands of research in behavioral economics have demonstrated
how inertia, procrastination, a tendency to over-value short-term consequences and under-value
long-term effects, or discomfort with facing confusing or difficult choices can lead people to try
to avoid decisions that require a great deal of paperwork to complete, which all means-tested
programs invariably do. What has become known as “digital nudging” or “digital choice
architecture” is viewed as a potential solution that can ease the cognitive strain required to
complete tedious paperwork (Weinmann, Schneider, and Brocke 2016).
Digital nudging is defined as the use of user-interface design elements to guide people’s
behavior in digital choice environments (Weinmann, Schneider, and Brocke 2016). Even simple
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modifications of the choice environment in which options are presented can influence people’s
decisions and has led to the conclusion that there are no neutral ways to present choices. For
instance, while having too few choices obviously constrains choice, having too many options can
be overwhelming and lead to cognitive shortcuts (e.g., going with the recommended “default”
option) (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1998). If the default option is not welfare-enhancing, people
will tend to accept the suboptimal option rather than to determine which option is actually
optimal/preferable (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2005).
A related set of biases that contributes to procrastination and inertia is the concept of ego
depletion (Baumeister et al. 1998). Ego depletion refers to the fact that people have a finite pool
of cognitive, emotional, or physical energy. As we put more energy into a task, our finite pool
becomes depleted and we become less willing and able to assert self-control. Large amounts of
paperwork and documentation can contribute to ego depletion, but those most in need of social
services often face even greater amounts of stress and instability, which may be compounded by
the psychological feeling of shame associated with program participation or the perception that
participation is undesirable (Soss 1999). Even if individuals are eligible for a program, their
inability to produce necessary paperwork and the cognitive strain this produces may be
insurmountable.
This paper analyzes how changes in Medicaid and CHIP program rules across states have
diminished the cognitive burden required to sign-up for and remain enrolled in these programs.
Some of these efforts to ease burden occurred prior to the Affordable Care Act whereas others
were precipitated by ACA reforms or were more widely adopted as a result of the ACA.
Moreover, while some of the reforms were targeted specifically at increasing enrollment
amongst children, we believe that the interaction between these existing policies and the new
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push to increase health insurance coverage brought about by the ACA may have positive spillover effects in terms of enrollment on other categorical eligibility groups who may not have
previously been aware of their own eligibility (e.g., parents/adults). Below, we outline the five
principle behaviorally-informed rule categories examined. Table 1 describes each of these
categories and rule differences in greater detail.
Digital nudging: Online account/interface ease. There are a number of ways that the use
of the online, digital environment can be used to ease the process of checking one’s program
eligibility status and for enrollment and renewal purposes. Before the ACA, individuals in many
states could not apply for Medicaid by phone or online and typically had to provide
documentation like pay stubs and wait for long periods for an eligibility determination. The ACA
provided states with enhanced federal funding to support replacing or upgrading outdated
eligibility and renewal systems. Through major investments, states have expanded the consumerfriendly features of online applications over time. The development of the health care Exchanges
created a simplified interface that eased enrollment burden and made eligibility electronic. States
vary, however, in the ease of the digital interface adopted for the Exchanges―for instance, in
terms of whether a person can complete and submit an application form using a mobile device
and whether an account can be made to store information and return to the application. Such
differences likely affect the ease of signing-up for Medicaid and can send signals about
eligibility for other assistance programs including through Express Lane Eligibility (see Table 1
in Appendix for more details).
Recent data from the Pew Center study on the Digital Divide show that only 10% US
households report not using the internet. Of that 10%, 27% are over the age of 65 (Anderson et
al. 2019). While there is a socio-economic gradient such that lower-income and lower-education
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individuals are more likely to fall in that 10% of households not using the internet, this share is
probably less once individuals age 65+ are taken out (who would be eligible for Medicare
anyway). Further, the Pew Center studies on the digital divide have found that smart
phones/devices act to bridge digital gaps between rich and poor and race-ethnic groups. In other
words, while low income households are less likely to own a computer than higher income
households, they are equally likely to have smart phones. A majority of low-income Blacks and
Hispanics own smart phones (Perrin 2017). This is why the digital access variables that capture
smart phone capabilities are potentially quite crucial in that lower income groups are less likely
to have home computers but are equally likely as other groups to have smart phones.
Automation of eligibility decisions via the Exchanges. One of the major policy
innovations in the ACA was development of health care “Exchanges”―virtual marketplaces
where the public could shop for qualified health insurance plans. The theory behind the
Exchanges has its roots in the behavioral economics concepts previously mentioned, particularly
the idea that having too many choices can lead to sub-optimal decision-making. Unlike
neoclassical economics, behaviorally informed economics recognizes that individuals will use
cognitive shortcuts to form judgements when confronted with more choices than they can
manage. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) point to the example of the insurance industry where
consumers may assume the plan recommended by an insurance salesperson is the most welfareenhancing when it is not. Given the complexity of understanding the trade-offs in insurance
plans, consumers are easily overwhelmed and confused. The purpose of the Exchanges was to
simplify the process of shopping for health insurance. The plans on the Exchanges were to be
labeled in terms of increasingly precious “metals,” which correspond to the “richness” of the
insurance plan. The bronze-level represents the least coverage in the sense of the most out-of-
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pocket spending (though also the lowest premium contribution), whereas the platinum-level
represents the lowest out-of-pocket spending (but highest monthly premium). Only plans that
include all “essential health benefits” mandated under the ACA would be allowed to be sold on
the marketplaces to help protect customers. The functionality of the Exchanges was also
supposed to allow for side-by-side price comparisons across plans to protect against information
asymmetry. Finally, the Exchanges were presumed to be a way that many individuals might learn
they actually qualified for Medicaid.
One way that the Exchanges may have increased enrollment is through their ability to
link with other administrative databases to enable “real time” and “express lane” eligibility
determinations. Even prior to the adoption of the ACA, The Children’s Health Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) created the Express Lane Eligibility (ELE)
option, permitting states to use data and eligibility findings from other public benefit programs to
determine whether children or others are eligible for Medicaid and CHIP. Some states have
adopted ELE and others have not; states also vary in terms of implementing agencies and
qualifying programs. Additionally, the goal of the Exchanges was to allow citizens to apply
through a streamlined process that would allow real-time eligibility determinations and
enrollments (i.e., less than 24 hours). To enable real-time determinations, states have allowed
eligibility to be verified through self-attestation and electronic data accessed through the federal
data services hub and other state, federal, and private data sources. The implementation of realtime eligibility determinations has also varied across the states.
The fact that the Exchanges are not solely designed for those who are eligible for
Medicaid but rather for all individuals to shop for insurance (including private insurance) may
reduce the stigma associated with checking one’s Medicaid eligibility status. Moreover, the
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“working poor” may be more likely to underestimate their Medicaid eligibility status and to
subsequently learn they are, in fact, eligible when shopping through the Exchanges.
Enrollment and renewal rule ease. Predating the ACA were a number of rules that states
could optionally adopt concerning enrollment and renewal processes. This includes “presumptive
eligibility” rules whereby states could authorize “qualified entities” (health care providers,
community-based organizations, and schools, among others) to screen for Medicaid and CHIP
eligibility and immediately enroll children or others who appeared to be eligible. Under 12month continuous eligibility, states can disregard changes in income until renewal, which
enables states to provide more stable coverage over the course of a year. A new innovation has
been the use of automated renewals and prepopulated forms at renewal, which can further
facilitate the maintenance of health benefits over time. Similar to data-driven enrollment, states
are obligated to use electronic data under the ACA when available to renew coverage without
requiring an individual to fill out a renewal form or provide documentation. This approach
minimizes paperwork for individuals and reduces workloads for states.
Medicaid eligibility expansion. Many have assumed Medicaid eligibility expansion
would have the greatest impact on program enrollment by reducing a large element of the
administrative burden associated with the program, namely certain categorical eligibility
requirements. The expansion of Medicaid to all individuals earning under 138% of the federal
poverty line was undoubtedly a large boon to enrollment. States that expanded Medicaid saw the
proportion of residents with insurance increase by 5.9 percentage points compared to 3 points in
states that did not expand (Courtemanche et al. 2016). However, it is important to remember that
even prior to the ACA, states varied in the income eligibility thresholds across various
categorical eligibility groups with pregnant women, parents, and children of different ages
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subject to different thresholds. In addition to adjusting eligibility for non-parents, states were
able to adjust their eligibility thresholds for other groups. Accordingly, we treat eligibility
thresholds primarily as a control variable to tease out the impact of other behaviorally-informed
changes to enrollment and renewal processes, though normalizing eligibility thresholds may also
constitute a rule-simplification.
Using data collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation, we generate a time-series index
that captures changes in implementation of the Affordable Care Act over the period 2008-2017.
The index captures changes in the three major categories of enrollment and renewal process
simplification, including online access, automation of eligibility decisions via the Exchanges,
and enrollment and renewal burden easing while adjusting for changes in income eligibility for
categorical eligibility groups across states. We ask what effect state choices to adopt simplified
enrollment and renewal procedures in Medicaid and CHIP over 2008-2017 have had on program
participation rates overall and by categorical eligibility group.
Cumulatively, this research contributes to expanding our understanding of how
administrative burden affects citizens’ experience of the state and brings together several
different strands of literature on social policy, administrative burden, behavioral economics, and
bureaucratic politics. We argue that while the US safety-net has been politically constructed in a
manner that views welfare as an option of last resort and places emphasis on restricting access to
public service provision by enacting a dense web of administrative rules that must be carefully
navigated by both clients and case workers, recent changes precipitated by the Affordable Care
Act have moved social policy in a less restrictive direction. In doing so, it builds on earlier work
examining changes to Medicaid enrollment and renewal rules occasioned by the implementation
of the SCHIP program (Kronebusch and Elbel 2004).
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Methods
We run two-way fixed effects models with state-level data on Medicaid/CHIP enrollment
between 2008-2017 to examine the role of reductions in administrative burden occasioned by the
Affordable Care Act in increasing program enrollment rates adjusting for other factors associated
with increased enrollment. Below we describe our data sources and approach in more detail.
Dependent variable: Medicaid/CHIP enrollment rate (logged). We examine changes in
enrollment in Medicaid overall and stratified by children and adults. We use aggregate, annual
data on the proportion of the total population as well as adults (age 19-64) and children (<19)
enrolled in Medicaid/CHIP publicly available through the Census Bureau. The estimates we
access are derived from the American Community Survey and cover the years 2008-2017.1 As
states vary in the proportion of the population that may be eligible given differences in incomes
across states, we divide the proportion of the population on Medicaid/CHIP by the proportion of
the population that is below 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL) for children/overall and
200% FPL for adults. We select these income thresholds as the denominator because it
represents the maximum income levels that qualifies children for CHIP and pregnant women
across all state years respectively. This produces an estimate of the proportion of individuals
living below 400%/200% FPL that are enrolled in Medicaid, which can allow us to see broadly
how Medicaid is reaching low- and moderate-income households. We logged the variable to
correct for skewness and facilitate interpretation.

The state-level estimates of aggregate Medicaid/CHIP coverage are provided in a spreadsheet and can be accessed
at this weblink: https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257.html. The spreadsheets we used
are entitled “HIC-4. Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State--All Persons: 2008 to 2017”;
“HIC-5.Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State--Children Under 19: 2008 to 2017”;
“HIC-6.Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State--Persons Under 65: 2008 to 2017”
1
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While we break out Medicaid participation by different categorical eligibility groups, we
are hypothesizing broad spill-over effects from the various changes in insurance access driven by
the ACA (Cutler and Gruber 1995; Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; Haley et al. 2018). While the
Medicaid expansion (expanding Medicaid eligibility to 138% FPL for able-bodied adults without
dependents), should primarily increase participation in this categorical eligibility group,
reductions in administrative burden are generally targeted towards either adults or dependents
but not both. For instance, certain presumptive eligibility and express lane eligibility apply solely
explicitly to children, while other provisions apply to adults. For this reason, we examine
enrollment rates separately and hypothesize a larger administrative easing-induced increase in
enrollment among adults compared with children who already had more provisions that
increased their probability of enrollment.
On the other hand, we might expect spill-over effects from rules geared towards adults on
child enrollment. For instance, the development of Exchanges arguably brought broad-based,
wide-spread attention to health insurance coverage. Millions of people across the country
checked their eligibility for subsidized private health plans in addition to Medicaid. According to
HealthCare.gov, over 4.25 million people visited the Federal website created by the Affordable
Care Act) in September of 2018 alone.2 We therefore hypothesize that this surge in attention to
insurance coverage may have led a broad set of individuals, including those who did not
previously know their eligibility status, nor the status of their children, to check their eligibility,
and, if eligible, to enroll in the program. This surge should be greater in states that eased their
administrative burden more. While we are measuring both Medicaid and CHIP enrollment, as a
shorthand, we will simply use the term “Medicaid” enrollment throughout the manuscript.

2

See here: https://www.similarweb.com/website/healthcare.gov
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Independent variable(s): Administrative easing index and sub-indices. To capture what
we refer to as “administrative easing,” we generated a composite index comprised of the four
major categories of enrollment and renewal ease that vary across states described above: 1. Real
time eligibility; 2. Digital access;; 3. Enrollment ease; and 4. Renewal ease. Table 1 outlines how
we have categorized different rules across the four dimensions and coded each variable. All
variables were coded such that a rule that facilitated greater ease and reduced the cognitive
burden of signing-up for Medicaid received a score of 1 and a state not adopting such reforms
received a score of 0. Each variable was summed and averaged to produce a score ranging from
0 to 1. A state receiving a score of 1 in a given category would signify that they have adopted all
possible administrative easing reduction strategies and a zero would mean that the state did not
adopt any strategies. Each sub-index was then summed to produce an overall index capturing the
extent of implementation of administrative easing. In a further sensitivity analysis, we also
created separate dimensions for child versus adult enrollment and renewal rules as certain rules
are more pertinent to adults while others are more pertinent to child enrollment. We ran models
with the disaggregated enrollment and renewal rule indices. The results of these models are
summarized in the Statistical Appendix). However, we preferred the models that did not
disaggregate enrollment and renewal rules by categorical eligibility group because this exercise
revealed that conceptually it is not so easy to separate the effects of rules as they pertain to one
group from another. Some rules like the ability to apply by telephone or asset tests may equally
discourage people from checking their own status as well as the status of their children.
Moreover, because most benefits are accessed by a family unit, changes in rules pertaining to
one group may have impacts on the other group. For instance, it stands to reason that if someone
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is checking their own eligibility, this might spur them to also check the eligibility of others in
their family unit in a way they would not have otherwise done.
Control variables. We adjusted for several time varying variables that may have also
been changing over our timeframe, including state poverty rate, unemployment rate, and Gross
State Product (GSP) per capita. Additionally, we adjust for a measure of income eligibility
threshold generosity. Income eligibility thresholds for each categorical eligibility group (i.e.,
parents, pregnant women, children under 18) were obtained from the Kaiser Family Foundation
for each state year. Thresholds were divided by the maximum value (i.e., for children, out of
400% FPL) to create a proportion of the maximum. All threshold indices were averaged to create
a total income eligibility index for all categorical eligibility groups. Non-parents were treated as
0 prior to the adoption of the ACA. In sensitivity analyses, we adjust for an additional set of
controls including percent Hispanic, SNAP and TANF eligibility rules and state ideology. The
results are quite stable but contain more missing values so we retain the more parsimonious
models as the main results. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the index and other measures.
Analysis. We first run descriptive statistics and bivariate regression analysis with each
predictor variable separately. To illustrate intuitively the relationship between administrative
easing and program enrollment, divided states into even terciles representing high, medium, and
low implementer states and assessed change in enrollment proportions in each category of states
over our time-period (see Graph 1). We then ran two-way (state and year) fixed effects models
with clustered standard errors to assess the impact on change in administrative easing scores on
change in enrollment rates over time. All predictors were lagged by one year to account for the
implementation timeline. We undertook multiple sensitivity analyses including using no lag, an
unlogged dependent variable, as well as entering different sets of controls. We also tried
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reorganizing the dimensions in different ways (disaggregating by different categorical eligibility
groups, etc.). The results were quite stable and produced similar results to our preferred models.

Results
The most aggressive states in terms of administrative easing were Colorado, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina; the least were Tennessee, Alaska, Illinois, and Georgia. No
state adopted every possible reduction strategy (see Table A1). Tennessee was the only state that
failed to adopt an online enrollment system in 2014, which partly contributed to its low overall
Administrative Easing score. Texas and Maryland adopted every Digital Choice Architecture
easing option.
Graph 1 summarizes change in the proportion of the population enrolled in Medicaid by
high, medium, and low administrative easing implementation states. Low implementation states
already had a higher proportion of the population enrolled in Medicaid compared with high and
medium implementation states. However, high implementation states saw a larger increase in
enrollments over the period compared with low and medium implementers. This was especially
the case for adults where high implementers saw a particularly steep rise in enrollments.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the sample and Tables 3 and 4 show the results of
bivariate and multi-variate fixed effects models respectively. In bivariate analyses, all measures
of administrative easing significantly predicted increased enrollment (Table 3). While increases
in income eligibility thresholds predicted the greatest increase in enrollment (coef=1.84, p<0.01),
all administrative easing variables also predicted higher enrollment (Table 3). In the multivariate
models, adjusting for other rule changes and income eligibility thresholds, some administrative
easing variables lost significance including digital access and renewal easing.
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However, even adjusting for the change in Medicaid eligibility thresholds, real time eligibility,
and enrollment burden easing were each associated with increases in program enrollment overall
and for both children and adults (Table 4, All). Disaggregating by adult and child enrollments,
however, reveals that more of the association between administrative burden reductions and
enrollments was driven by child enrollment. Enrollment burden easing was associated with
increased enrollments in adults only at the 90% confidence level. Moreover, in sensitivity
analyses in the Appendix, we find that rules pertaining to child enrollment were associated with
increased enrollments of children but not adults.
Overall, moving from the least to most generous state in terms of the implementation of
implementing real time eligibility was associated with a 2 percent increase in the predicted
Medicaid participation overall, holding everything else constant (coef.=0.02, p<0.01) and an 8
and 11 percent increase for children and adults respectively. Enrollment rule easing was
associated with a 3 percent increase in enrollment (coef.=0.03, p<0.05) and was more impactful
on child enrollment than adult enrollment. Renewal easing and digital access had no impact on
enrollment adjusting for other measures.

Discussion
Administrative burden is believed to be a significant barrier to program enrollment.
While the Medicaid expansion is perhaps the best-known change precipitated by the ACA—one
believed to have contributed the most to the nearly 20 million Americans who gained insurance
coverage post-ACA—a number of other lesser known reforms may have also contributed
significantly to uptake by reducing the cognitive burden required to sign-up for coverage.
Relatively minor changes to the “choice architecture” that occurred over this period include
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reducing the amount of paperwork by enabling automatic enrollments, prefilled forms,
information from other programs to confer eligibility, and enhanced online capabilities. We
examined the effect of variations in these reforms on Medicaid enrollments and find evidence
that states that have adopted more administrative easing strategies have seen a higher increase in
enrollments over time even accounting for changes in income eligibility.
In particular, rules that ease the cognitive burden associated with enrollment, including
receiving real time eligibility decisions in <24 hours, and a variety of changes in enrollment rules
(including presumptive eligibility, express lane eligibility based on other program determinations
and reduced wait times), cumulatively had a significant and substantive effect on enrollments.
Based on predictions related to procrastination, inertia, and general cognitive ease, we believed
and found evidence that such “nudging” strategies would likely impact enrollment apart from
simply making people categorically eligible based on their income.
However, other variations in state implementation of administrative easing that we
believed should have direct effects on enrollment did not. This included enhanced digital access,
which refers to features such as whether or not an individual can apply for Medicaid online,
whether an application can be stored online, whether individuals can access the account using a
smart phone, whether an App is available, etc. Given that evidence on the digital divide suggests
that smart phones/devices act to bridge digital gaps between rich and poor and race-ethnic groups
(Perrin 2017), we were expecting smart phone access to play a more central role in increasing
enrollment, but we did not find support for this. It may be that applicants unfamiliar with the
process still require in-person assistance, especially in states not implementing real time
eligibility. The consistent significance of real time eligibility in predicting enrollment suggests
that ego depletion and inertia may be a major underlying reason for otherwise eligible

26

individuals’ failure to enroll in Medicaid. Real time eligibility refers to the ability of individuals
applying online through a state Exchange to determine their eligibility right away, often by
submitting self-attestation of income, which can later be administratively verified. Case studies
from Colorado and Washington suggest that the successful implementation of real-time
eligibility and automated renewal systems was very beneficial for consumers, allowing them to
obtain coverage more quickly and easily (Wishner et al, 2018).
However, the easing of burdens associated with the renewal process (as opposed to initial
enrollment), did not significantly impact enrollments after accounting for other changes to the
choice architecture. While much attention has been placed on getting people onto Medicaid, less
attention has been paid to the onerous processes associated with staying enrolled and how this
might smooth access to insurance over time. This finding may reinforce the notion that many of
the barriers to gaining access to Medicaid arise on the front-end of seeking out enrollment in a
public program (e.g., stigma, onerousness).
While we hypothesized that we would see stronger effects of reductions in administrative
burden on adults, in fact we saw the reverse. The effect of these burden reductions were more
pronounced in child enrollment. We believe this lends credence to the idea that while eligibility
thresholds are more generous for children, in fact, they under-participate largely owing to the
administrative burden required to sign up, the effects of which accrues primarily to parents.
Reductions in administrative burden therefore did not only serve to increase enrollments among
those gaining access to coverage for the first time, but also served to increase enrollments in
groups that were not specifically the targets of the ACA- i.e., children. As most benefits are
accessed by a family unit, it stands to reason that if someone is checking and discovering his/her
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own eligibility, this might spur them to also check the eligibility of others in their family unit,
leading to a higher probability of discovering one’s eligibility status.
While we found significant effects of relatively minor changes to the choice architecture
on enrollment, there may also be other less tangible ways that the changes to Medicaid
enrollment procedures have impacted program uptake that relate more broadly to the themes
raised in the introduction concerning the social construction of target groups and representative
and street-level bureaucracy theories. While critics of digital automation of eligibility decisions
have raised concerns about how these detached processes may remove discretion in ways that
could be harmful to potential program beneficiaries (Eubanks, 2017), these trepidations may
underestimate the broader barriers to public program enrollment endemic in the context of liberal
welfare states such as the US. It is a well-known statistic that a large majority of Americans
consider themselves “middle-class” even though the data do not bear this out. Many individuals
may perceive themselves as ineligible or may not want to consider themselves eligible for public
assistance. Prior to the enactment of the health care Exchanges, many individuals had to actively
engage with burdensome administrative processes in order to determine their eligibility for
Medicaid. While certain steps taken (e.g., CHIPRA) prior to the ACA helped normalize
enrollment processes (such as the use of presumptive eligibility), the adoption of the Exchanges
with the ability of users to inadvertently check their status and receive real-time eligibility
determinations may have served to recruit a new set of eligible non-participants that otherwise
would not be captured. Moreover, while the digital environment may lessen administrative
discretion to a degree, streamlined rules and procedures also remove administrator bias in a way
that may be beneficial to certain groups.
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In terms of advancing theory on administrative burden more broadly, we believe this
study reinforces the Heinrich’s entreaty to “broaden the conceptual framing of administrative
burden and extend its empirical investigation beyond concerns about access to and efficiency of
public services to questions of individual and societal impacts” (2015: 403). Our findings also
reinforce Herd and Moynihan's (2018) observation that burdens are both consequential in that
they affect citizen outcomes and that they are distributive in that they do not affect all citizen
outcomes equally. When it comes to social policy, programs targeting those at the lower end of
the income distribution face a greater degree of administrative burden. Though beyond the scope
of this study, our findings illustrate how administrative burdens send signals regarding the level
of trust that government has in its citizens and who is deserving/underserving of benefits, which
has implications for policy feedback in terms of citizens perceptions of the state (Michener,
2018). This is reflected in the fact that, as a consequence of the ACA normalizing and expanding
access to public health insurance and reducing enrollment burden and stigma, Medicaid is
increasingly being seen as on par with other universalistic social policies (Grogan and Park
2018)—a trend with broader implications for social policy.
Limitations. While we have tried to be as thorough as possible in our analysis, there are
several ways the study could be further strengthened. First, in an ideal world we would be able to
look at this question over an even longer time span. Our data on Medicaid enrollment only goes
up to 2017 even though we have more recent data on program rules. Examining this question
over a longer time frame could increase our confidence in the results and the power in the
analysis.
A second caution is that the use of fixed effects, while aiming to isolate the impact of a
change in policy on a change in outcome, also limits inferences to states in which there was no or
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few changes in administrative easing over this time period. Certain states changed little over or
not at all over this time period. We have tried to address this by including continuous measures
that predate the adoption of the ACA and the implementation of the Medicaid
expansion/Exchanges.
A third caution is that the precise timing of implementation of each of the administrative
easing policies captured in the index cannot be assessed based on the data provided by the Kaiser
Family Foundation. For instance, we know when there was a change in a variable from the
previous year, but not exactly when during the year that the implementation occurred. Finally,
there may be other program variables that were not captured as part of the index, though we have
done a more thorough job than many studies accounting for the multiple changes occurring over
this period and in response to the ACA legislation. Moreover, using aggregated indices of a wide
variety of relatively minor rule changes, we are unable to detect which rules individually had the
most impact on enrollment, though the bivariate analyses are instructive. Future research could
try to tease out whether particular rules are especially burdensome, however, it may be the case
that the interaction of burdens is more impactful than any one burden on its own.
A fourth caution is that simplification does not necessarily mean simple. While the
Exchanges and enrollment rule simplification aimed at streamlining the process of enrollment,
the process can still be quite overwhelming and confusing, both for individuals looking for
subsidized plans on the individual market and individuals who might find that they are eligible
for Medicaid.

Conclusion
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In the US, a liberal welfare state, means-tested categorical eligibility programs such as
Medicaid are generally cast in a negative light as vehicles for the (potentially) undeserving poor
to free-ride off of the tax paying public. As a consequence, welfare enrollment processes have
generally been designed to prioritize fraud reduction and with the assumption that people are
ineligible until proven otherwise. Certain provisions of the ACA sought to reverse this
assumption for Medicaid by encouraging states to ease the cognitive burden required to enroll in
these programs. Insights from behavioral economics explicitly guided some of these efforts at
administrative easing. We found that states that reduced the administrative burden required to
enroll in these programs have seen higher increases in Medicaid uptake, even adjusting for the
changes in income eligibility thresholds, suggesting that efforts to ease the cognitive strain
associated with enrolling in public programs can improve participation.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Summary of Medicaid Administrative Rule Coding
Variable Name
Real Time
Eligibility
(proportion of
decisions)
Digital Access

real_time_elig_dec

online_application

Definition

Explanation

Coding

The proportion of Eligibility
Determinations the state
makes in "real time" (<24
Hours)
Medicaid Applications can be
submitted online at the state
level

A speedier determination process
should constitute less administrative
burden

<25%=.125; 2550%=.375; 5075%=.625;
75%+=.875
1=Yes; 0=No

online_account

Individual can create an
online account for Medicaid

apply_mobile_device

Online Application- Can be
completed and submitted
using a mobile device
Online Application- does it
have a mobile-friendly
design?

mobile_friendly_design

mobile_app_avail

Online Application- is a
Mobile App Available?

access_account_mob_device

Online Account- Can be
accessed using a mobile
device

online_account_mob_friend_design

Online Account- is a MobileFriendly Design used?

online_account_mobile_app_avail

Online Account- is a Mobile
App Available?

Is an online application process
available for Medicaid? (as opposed to
only in person at a Medicaid office or
by phone)
If an individual can create an online
account that stores their info, this
should constitute a reduction in admin
burden
If a person can submit a Medicaid
application on their smart device, this
should constitute less admin burden
If the online application on the mobile
device has a mobile friendly design, in
theory this will make applying on
one’s phone easier
A designated mobile app that people
can use that is strategically designed to
ease the enrollment process=less
admin burden
The ability to access one's online
account on a mobile device should ease
admin burden by allowing users to
save information they have already
entered and return to the application
rather than having to start over.
An online account with a mobile
friendly design should make applying
on a mobile device easier.
Is the online account available via a
Mobile App?

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No
1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No
1=Yes; 0=No
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Enrollment Ease
(Children)

Enroll_wait_length_months

Enroll_Elim_F2F_Int_SSP_Medicaid

Indicates whether the state has
eliminated the waiting period
to become eligible for
enrollment or impose a
waiting period.
Eliminates requirement of a
face-to-face interview for
enrollment

Enroll_Elim_Asset_Test_SSP_Medicaid

Indicates whether a state has
eliminated an asset or
resource test for Medicaid
eligibility or CHIP eligibility
for children.

12m_cont_elig_Medicaid

12-Month Continuous
Eligibility for Children for
Medicaid

12m_cont_elig_SSP

12-Month Continuous
Eligibility for Children for
SCHIP

States may impose a waiting period to
become eligible for enrollment in
Medicaid (states range from 0-12
months)

1-(# of
months/12)

Federal law does not require face-toface interviews at the time of
application or renewal in either
Medicaid or CHIP. Requiring parents
who often lack flexibility to leave work
to appear in person to apply for or
renew coverage for their children
makes it more difficult for parents to
seek or retain that coverage.
States have long had the discretion
under federal law to not impose an
asset or resource test for Medicaid
eligibility. Asset tests not only reduce
the pool of people that might be
eligible by excluding individuals that
happen to be property owners from
accessing Medicaid, it can also imply
more paperwork to demonstrate a lack
of asset ownership.
States have an option to provide 12month continuous eligibility to
children, which enables them to
provide more stable coverage by
disregarding changes in income until
renewal.
States have an option to provide 12month continuous eligibility to
children, which enables them to
provide more stable coverage by
disregarding changes in income until
renewal.

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

33

Enrollment Ease
(Adults)

presump_elig_Medicaid

Presumptive Eligibility for
Children's Medicaid

presump_elig_SSP

Presumptive EligibilityChildren's SCHIP

enroll_express_lane_elig_Medicaid

Express Lane Eligibility for
Children at EnrollmentMedicaid

enroll_express_lane_elig_SSP

Express Lane Eligibility for
Children at Enrollment_CHIP

telephone_application

Medicaid applications can be
submitted by telephone at the
state level
Eliminates requirement of a
face-to-face interview for
enrollment
Indicates whether a state has
eliminated an asset or
resource test for Medicaid
eligibility for parents.

Enroll_Elim_F2F_Int_Parents
Enroll_Elim_Asset_Test_P

States can authorize “qualified entities”
-- health care providers, communitybased organizations, and schools,
among others -- to screen for Medicaid
and CHIP eligibility and immediately
enroll children who appear to be
eligible.
States can authorize “qualified entities”
-- health care providers, communitybased organizations, and schools,
among others -- to screen for Medicaid
and CHIP eligibility and immediately
enroll children who appear to be
eligible.
Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) allows
states to enroll children in Medicaid
based on findings from other programs,
like SNAP.
Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) allows
states to enroll children in CHIP based
on findings from other programs, like
SNAP.
Can individuals apply by telephone for
Medicaid? (as opposed to only in
person at a Medicaid office)
Same as for children- eliminates the
requirement of a face-to-face interview
to determine parents eligibility.
States have long had the discretion
under federal law to not impose an
asset or resource test for Medicaid
eligibility. Asset tests not only reduce
the pool of people that might be
eligible by excluding individuals that
happen to be property owners from
accessing Medicaid, it can also imply
more paperwork to demonstrate a lack
of asset ownership.

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No
1=Yes; 0=No
1=Yes; 0=No
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Renewal Ease
(Children)

presump_elig_PW

Presumptive Eligibility for
Pregnant Women

presump_elig_Parents

Presumptive Eligibility for
Parents

presump_elig_childless_adults

Presumptive EligibilityChildless Adults

renew_no_F2F_SSP_Medicaid

Eliminates requirement of a
face-to-face interview for
enrollment
Measures the period in which
renewal/redetermination of
eligibility must occur
assuming state does not have
continuous eligibility.

renew_freq_SSP_Medicaid

renew_express_lane_Medicaid

Express Lane Eligibility for
Children at Renewal for
Medicaid

renew_express_lane_SSP

Express Lane Eligibility for
Children at Renewal for
SCHIP

States can authorize “qualified entities”
-- health care providers, communitybased organizations, and schools,
among others -- to screen for Medicaid
eligibility and immediately enroll
pregnant women who appear to be
eligible.
The ACA broadened the use of
presumptive eligibility to parents and
childless adults by allowing states that
use qualified entities to presumptively
enroll children or pregnant women to
extend the policy to parents, adults,
and other groups.
The ACA broadened the use of
presumptive eligibility to parents and
childless adults by allowing states that
use qualified entities to presumptively
enroll children or pregnant women to
extend the policy to parents, adults,
and other groups.
Same description as for enrollment

1=Yes; 0=No

Lower frequency of renewal
constitutes less administrative burden

1-(# of
months/12)

Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) allows
states to renew children in Medicaid
based on findings from other programs,
like SNAP.
Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) allows
states to enroll or renew children in
CHIP based on findings from other
programs, like SNAP.

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No
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Renewal Ease
(Adults)

renew_telephone

Telephone Renewals

Telephone renewals ease
administrative burden as opposed to
having to renew in person.
Allowing a person to renew online
eases administrative burden compared
with having them renew in person.
Similar to data-driven enrollment,
under the ACA, states are to use
electronic data when available to
renew coverage without requiring an
individual to fill out a renewal form or
provide documentation. This approach
minimizes paperwork for individuals
and reduces workloads for states.
If a renewal cannot be completed based
on available data, states are expected to
send a pre-populated notice or renewal
form to the enrollee and to allow
individuals to renew by phone.

1=Yes; 0=No

online_renew

Online renewal

admin_renew

Processing Automated
Renewals

renew_prepop_form

Prepopulated Renewal Form

renew_no_F2F_Parents

Eliminates requirement of a
face-to-face interview for
enrollment for parents
Measures the period in which
renewal/redetermination of
eligibility must occur
assuming state does not have
continuous eligibility.

Same description as for enrollment

1=Yes; 0=No

Lower frequency of renewal
constitutes less administrative burden

1-(# of
months/12)

Medicaid_Eligibility_01

Income Eligibility for
Children less than 1 year old

Medicaid_Eligibility_02

Income Eligibility for
Children 1 to 5 years old

Income
threshold/max
threshold in each
categorical
eligibility group

Medicaid_Eligibility_03

Income Eligibility for
Children 6 to 18 years old

This functions as a control variable in
the analysis. Higher income eligibility
thresholds, especially for adults
without dependents, increase the size
of the population that is eligible for the
program. Administrative burden may
discourage enrollment even as
eligibility increases.

Medicaid_Eligibility_04

Income Eligibility for
Separate State Program

renew_freq_Parents

Income Eligibility

1=Yes; 0=No
1=Yes; 0=No

1=Yes; 0=No
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Medicaid_Eligibility_05
Medicaid_Eligibility_06

Income Eligibility for
Pregnant Women
Income Eligibility for Parents

Medicaid_Eligibility_07

Income Eligibility for Adults
(no dependents)

Medicaid_Elig_Index

Average score of all
categorical eligibility groups
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Graph 1: Annual Change in Medicaid/CHIP Enrollment Proportion by High, Medium and Low Administrative Easing Implementation
for Overall, and for Adults and Children

Notes: Administrative easing implementation intensity was measured in 2014 and states were divided into terciles and defined as low, medium and high
intensity implementers. The graph shows that while low implementers have consistently had the highest Medicaid/CHIP enrollment rates over time, the
increase in enrollments between 2013-2017 were more pronounced among high implementers.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variable
Obs Mean Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Participation All (400% FPL) 510 0.29
Participation Child (400% FPL) 510 0.57

0.08
0.12

0.14
0.22

0.63
1.11

Participation Adult (200% FPL) 510
Log Participation All
510
Log Participation Adult
510
Log Participation Child
510
Real Time Eligibility
510
Digital Access Score
510
Enrollment Rule Index
510
Renewal Rule Index
510
Administrative Easing Index
510
Income Threshold Index
510
GSP (logged)
510
Unemployment Rate
510
Poverty Rate
510

0.18
0.27
0.23
0.26
0.25
0.26
0.16
0.16
0.15
0.09
1.02
0.02
0.03

0.34
-1.94
-1.50
-1.08
0
0
0.25
.25
0.19
0.25
10.14
0.02
0.06

1.36
-0.47
0.11
0.31
0.88
1
1
1
0.86
0.63
14.85
0.14
0.23

Observations

0.68
-1.27
-0.58
-0.42
0.12
0.34
0.62
0.65
0.49
0.39
12.16
0.06
0.13

510
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Table 3: Bivariate Overall and Disaggregated by Categorical Eligibility Group (Children/% of
HH <400% FPL; Adults/% of HH <200% FPL) +

Real Time Eligibility
Online access index
Enrollment rule index
Renew rule index
Eligibility index
Poverty Rate
Unemployment rate
GSP per capita (logged)
Observations
Number of state_fips

ALL
b/ci95
0.381***
(0.303- 0.459)
0.381***
(0.311 - 0.450)
0.744***
(0.517 - 0.970)
0.560***
(0.444 - 0.676)
1.835***
(1.563 - 2.106)
-1.073**
(-2.017 - -0.128)
-4.070***
(-4.832 - -3.308)
1.024***
(0.787 - 1.261)
459
51

CHILD (<19)
b/ci95
0.250***
(0.205 - 0.295)
0.277***
(0.221 - 0.333)
0.545***
(0.379 - 0.710)
0.437***
(0.362 - 0.513)
1.082***
(0.875 - 1.289)
-0.299
(-0.950 - 0.352)
-2.317***
(-2.829 - -1.804)
0.776***
(0.598 - 0.954)
459
51

ADULT (19-64)
b/ci95
0.448***
(0.358-0.537)
0.425***
(0.351 - 0.498)
0.997***
(0.744 - 1.249)
0.612***
(0.482 - 0.742)
1.821***
(1.532 - 2.109)
-4.891***
(-6.102 - -3.680)
-5.693***
(-6.659 - -4.727)
1.265***
(0.982 - 1.547)
459
51

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, one-year lag

+
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Table 4: Multivariate Results Overall and Disaggregated by Categorical Eligibility Group
(Children/% of HH <400% FPL; Adults/% of HH <200% FPL)+
CHILD (<19)
b/ci95
0.0854***
(0.0431 - 0.128)
-0.0385
(-0.120 - 0.0433)
0.121**
(0.0228 - 0.219)
-0.0225
(-0.116 - 0.0714)
0.299**
(0.0614 - 0.536)
0.184
(-0.362 - 0.730)
-0.528
(-1.838 - 0.783)

ADULT (19-64)
b/ci95
0.118***
(0.0475 - 0.189)
-0.00837
(-0.132 - 0.115)
0.132*
(-0.0101 - 0.273)
-0.0421
(-0.163 - 0.0786)
1.060***
(0.698 - 1.423)
-0.232
(-0.972 - 0.508)
-2.226**
(-4.138 - -0.314)

-0.0470*
0.230*
(-0.0989 - 0.00501)
(-0.0275 - 0.488)
Constant
0.640**
-3.617**
(0.00362 - 1.276)
(-6.761 - -0.473)
Observations
459
459
R-squared
0.781
0.742
Number of state_fips
51
51
Robust ci in parentheses; year fixed effects included but not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+
fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, one-year lag

0.208**
(0.00586 - 0.411)
-3.205**
(-5.694 - -0.717)
459
0.752
51

Real Time Eligibility
Online access index
Enrollment rule index
Renew rule index
Eligibility index
Poverty Rate
Unemployment rate
GSP per capita
(logged)

ALL
b/ci95
0.0273***
(0.0150 - 0.0396)
-0.00253
(-0.0252 - 0.0201)
0.0305**
(0.00597 - 0.0551)
-0.01
(-0.0360 - 0.0160)
0.240***
(0.161 - 0.319)
0.0607
(-0.0701 - 0.191)
-0.157
(-0.517 - 0.202)
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Administrative Easing Sorted from the Most to Least Burden States in 2017

Income
Eligibility
Index

Real Time
Eligibility
Implementatio
n

Digital
Access
Index

Enrollmen
t Burden
Easing
Index

Renewal
Burden
Easing
Index

TOTAL
Administrativ
e Burden
Easing Index*

TENNESSEE

0.37

ALASKA

0.43

0

0

0.81

0.67

0.24

0

0.44

0.75

0.67

0.32

GEORGIA

0.29

0.125

0.67

0.81

0.83

0.35

INDIANA

0.45

0

0.44

0.91

1

0.36

UTAH

0.23

0

0.78

0.78

0.83

0.36

ILLINOIS

0.45

0

0.44

0.97

0.67

0.37

MAINE

0.32

0

0.67

0.84

0.83

0.37

SOUTH DAKOTA

0.24

0

0.56

0.66

1

0.39

NEW JERSEY

0.46

0

0.56

0.97

1

0.4

NORTH DAKOTA

0.37

0

0.89

0.72

1

0.4

TEXAS

0.26

0

1

0.78

1

0.41

WEST VIRGINIA

0.42

0

0.67

0.94

0.83

0.41

MISSISSIPPI

0.26

0.125

0.33

0.75

1

0.47

ARKANSAS
NORTH
CAROLINA
VIRGINIA

0.42

0.125

0.33

0.66

1

0.48

0.33

0.88

1

0.5

0.26

0.125

0.56

0.69

1

0.5

ARIZONA

0.38

0.375

0.56

0.66

1

0.52

FLORIDA

0.26

0.375

0.56

0.78

1

0.52

MINNESOTA

0.53

0.375

0.44

0.63

0.83

0.52

MISSOURI

0.35

0.875

0.33

0.94

1

0.52

KANSAS

0.25

0.125

0.44

0.97

0.83

0.53

NEBRASKA

0.3

0.125

0.56

0.81

1

0.53

NEVADA

0.39

0.125

0.56

0.69

0.83

0.53

VERMONT

0.5

0.875

0.44

0.69

1

0.53

RHODE ISLAND

0.5

0.875

0.56

0.69

1

0.55

DELAWARE

0.43

0.625

0.67

0.69

1

0.56

HAWAII

0.49

0.375

0.67

0.69

1

0.57

OKLAHOMA

0.29

0.875

0.89

0.69

1

0.57

OREGON

0.44

0.625

0.67

0.75

0.83

0.57

IDAHO

0.21

0.625

0.67

1

1

0.58

KENTUCKY

0.42

0.625

0.67

0.81

1

0.58

WASHINGTON

0.46

0.875

0.67

0.75

1

0.58

WISCONSIN

0.48

0.125

0.56

0.88

0.83

0.58

State

0.28

0.125
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ALABAMA

0.25

0.875

0.56

0.75

1

0.61

D.C.

0.68

0.125

0.56

0.81

1

0.61

MONTANA

0.4

0.875

0.67

1

1

0.61

WYOMING

0.25

0.125

0.89

0.93

0.83

0.61

CALIFORNIA

0.54

0.125

0.56

1

1

0.62

CONNECTICUT

0.51

0.875

0.67

0.94

1

0.62

OHIO
MASSACHUSETT
S
MARYLAND

0.43

0.125

0.67

1

1

0.62

0.56

0.69

1

0.64

0.54

0.875

1

0.69

1

0.65

MICHIGAN
NEW
HAMPSHIRE
NEW MEXICO

0.43

0.375

0.89

1

0.83

0.66

0.78

1

1

0.66

0.51

0.875

0.78

1

1

0.66

LOUISIANA
SOUTH
CAROLINA
PENNSYLVANIA

0.45

0.125

0.67

0.72

1

0.67

0.44

0.75

0.83

0.7

0.46

0.125

0.78

0.81

1

0.71

IOWA

0.58

0.125

0.56

0.99

0.83

0.73

NEW YORK

0.49

0.875

0.67

1

1

0.73

COLORADO

0.47

0.625

0.78

1

1

0.75

0.45

0.5

0.3

0.625

0.125

0.125

*This represents an average of the 4 sub-indices representing administrative ease/burden.
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variable
Obs Mean Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Participation All (400% FPL)
510 0.29
Participation Child (400% FPL) 510 0.57

0.08
0.12

0.14
0.22

0.63
1.11

Participation Adult (200% FPL)
Real Time Eligibility
Digital Access Score
Child Enrollment Burden
Adult Enrollment Burden

510
510
510
510
510

0.68
0.12
0.34
0.56
0.72

0.18
0.25
0.26
0.15
0.25

0.34
0
0
0.2
0

1.36
0.88
1
1
1

Child Renewal Burden
510
Adult Renewal Burden
510
Administrative Easing Index
510
Income Threshold Index
510
House/Senate Chamber Ideology 409

0.65
0.66
0.49
0.39
0.12

0.24
0.06
0.15
0.09
0.68

.05
0.33
0.19
0.25
-1.40

1
1
0.86
0.63
1.23

GSP (logged)
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate

510 12.16
510 0.06
510 0.13

1.02
0.02
0.03

10.14
0.02
0.06

14.85
0.14
0.23

Observations

510
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Table A3: Bivariate Overall and Disaggregated by Categorical Eligibility Group (Children/% of
HH <400% FPL; Adults/% of HH <200% FPL) +

Real Time Eligibility Rules
Digital Access
Enrollment Burden Easing, Child
Enrollment Burden Easing, Adult
Renewal Burden Easing, Child
Renewal Burden Easing, Adult
Income Eligibility Threshold
Poverty Rate
Unemployment rate
State House and Senate
Ideological Median, averaged

ALL
b/ci95

CHILDREN
b/ci95

ADULTS
b/ci95

0.38***
[0.30,0.46]
0.40***
[0.33,0.48]
0.82***
[0.67,0.98]
0.45***
[0.36,0.53]
0.91***
[0.49,1.33]
0.36***
[0.29,0.44]
2.43***
[1.97,2.89]
-1.07**
[-2.02,-0.13]
-4.07***
[-4.83,-3.31]

0.25***
[0.21,0.30]
0.29***
[0.23,0.36]
0.59***
[0.49,0.69]
0.31***
[0.25,0.37]
0.78***
[0.48,1.09]
0.28***
[0.23,0.33]
1.48***
[1.16,1.80]
-0.3
[-0.95,0.35]
-2.32***
[-2.83,-1.80]

0.48***
[0.38,0.58]
0.46***
[0.37,0.54]
1.00***
[0.82,1.18]
0.55***
[0.44,0.66]
1.12***
[0.62,1.63]
0.41***
[0.32,0.50]
2.87***
[2.34,3.39]
-3.18***
[-4.48,-1.88]
-6.72***
[-7.67,-5.78]

0.15***
[0.08,0.23]

0.14***
[0.08,0.19]

0.17***
[0.08,0.27]

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, one-year lag

+
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Table A4: Multivariate Results Overall and Disaggregated by Categorical Eligibility Group
(Children/% of HH <400% FPL; Adults/% of HH <200% FPL)+
ALL
b/ci95

CHILD (<19)
b/ci95

ADULT (19-64)
b/ci95

0.122***
(0.0665 - 0.177)
-0.0168
(-0.101 - 0.0676)
0.0714
(-0.0605 - 0.203)
0.0716**
(0.0146 - 0.129)
-0.146*
(-0.298 - 0.00611)
-0.0215
(-0.0844 - 0.0415)

0.0846***
(0.0426 - 0.127)
-0.0388
(-0.119 - 0.0413)
0.112*
(-0.0174 - 0.242)
0.0299
(-0.0233 - 0.0830)
0.000449
(-0.153 - 0.154)
-0.0174
(-0.0735 - 0.0387)

0.119***
(0.0505 - 0.187)
-0.0129
(-0.137 - 0.111)
0.0906
(-0.117 - 0.299)
0.051
(-0.0205 - 0.122)
-0.124
(-0.315 - 0.0666)
-0.0185
(-0.0937 - 0.0567)

1.036***
0.299**
(0.751 - 1.321)
(0.0588 - 0.539)
Poverty Rate
0.271
0.181
(-0.320 - 0.862)
(-0.362 - 0.724)
Unemployment rate
-0.987
-0.508
(-2.476 - 0.502)
(-1.820 - 0.804)
GSP (logged)
0.0725
0.235*
(-0.114 - 0.259)
(-0.0249 - 0.495)
Constant
-2.536**
-3.684**
(-4.860 - -0.212)
(-6.864 - -0.504)
Observations
459
459
R-squared
0.839
0.743
Number of state_fips
51
51
Robust ci in parentheses; year fixed effects included but not shown
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
+
fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, one-year lag

1.053***
(0.690 - 1.417)
-0.225
(-0.964 - 0.514)
-2.238**
(-4.172 - -0.304)
0.206**
(0.00267 - 0.409)
-3.109**
(-5.636 - -0.581)
459
0.752
51

Real time eligibility
decision
Online access index
Child enrollment rules
Adult enrollment rules
Child renewal burden
Adult renewal burden
Income Eligibility
Index
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Table A5: Detailed Bivariates+

Income Eligibility for Children less than 1 year old
Income Eligibility for Children 1 to 5 years old
Income Eligibility for Children 6 to 8 years old
Income Eligibility for State Seperate Program
Income Eligibility for Pregnant Women
Income Eligibility for Parents
Income Eligibility for No Dependent Adults
Income Eligibility Threshold Index
online_application
submit_app_electronically
online_account
mobile_friendly_design
start_stop_app
apply_mobile_device
online_app_mobile_friendly
mobileapp_avail_app_acc
online_renew
real_time_elig_dec
telephone_application

ALL

CHILD

ADULTS

b/ci95

b/ci95

b/ci95

1.51***

1.02***

1.79***

[0.62,2.40]

[0.45,1.60]

[0.68,2.90]

1.20***

0.81***

1.46***

[0.65,1.75]

[0.42,1.19]

[0.76,2.16]

1.05***

0.73***

1.29***

[0.57,1.52]

[0.36,1.10]

[0.71,1.87]

-0.02

-0.02

0

[-0.24,0.20]

[-0.17,0.13]

[-0.26,0.25]

1.68***

1.15***

1.98***

[0.79,2.57]

[0.59,1.71]

[0.90,3.05]

0.80***

0.35**

0.93***

[0.40,1.20]

[0.07,0.62]

[0.45,1.40]

0.76***

0.46***

0.86***

[0.64,0.87]

[0.37,0.54]

[0.71,1.01]

1.83***

1.08***

2.12***

[1.56,2.11]

[0.88,1.29]

[1.80,2.43]

0.15***

0.13***

0.12***

[0.12,0.18]

[0.11,0.16]

[0.09,0.15]

0.16***

0.13***

0.17***

[0.13,0.19]

[0.11,0.16]

[0.14,0.21]

0.20***

0.13***

0.25***

[0.16,0.24]

[0.10,0.15]

[0.20,0.29]

0.20***

0.12***

0.26***

[0.13,0.28]

[0.06,0.18]

[0.17,0.35]

0.17***

0.13***

0.20***

[0.14,0.20]

[0.10,0.15]

[0.16,0.24]

0.20***

0.12***

0.26***

[0.16,0.25]

[0.09,0.16]

[0.20,0.31]

0.15***

0.06*

0.19***

[0.07,0.22]

[-0.01,0.14]

[0.11,0.27]

0.22***

0.15***

0.30***

[0.15,0.29]

[0.11,0.20]

[0.24,0.36]

0.14***

0.11***

0.16***

[0.10,0.19]

[0.08,0.14]

[0.10,0.21]

0.38***

0.25***

0.48***

[0.30,0.46]

[0.21,0.30]

[0.38,0.58]

0.18***

0.13***

0.22***
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admin_renew
telephone_renew
Enroll_wait_length_m
Enroll_Elim_F2F_Int_SSP_Medicaid
Enroll_Elim_F2F_Int_Parents
Enroll_Elim_Asset_Test_SSP_Medicaid
Enroll_Elim_Asset_Test_Parents
Presump_Elig_SSP_Medicaid
Presump_Elig_PW
Cont_Elig_SSP_Medicaid
Renew_no_F2F_SSP_Medicaid
Renew_no_F2F_Parents
Renew_freq_SSP_Medicaid
Renew_freq_Parents
ELE_enroll_Medicaid_SSP
ELE_renew_Medicaid
Administrative Easing Index
Poverty Rate
Unemployment rate
House Ideology

[0.15,0.22]

[0.10,0.15]

[0.18,0.27]

0.14***

0.12***

0.15***

[0.11,0.18]

[0.09,0.14]

[0.10,0.21]

0.17***

0.13***

0.20***

[0.13,0.20]

[0.10,0.15]

[0.15,0.24]

0.43***

0.28***

0.52***

[0.31,0.55]

[0.19,0.36]

[0.36,0.67]

0.15***

0.13***

0.21***

[0.07,0.24]

[0.09,0.18]

[0.11,0.31]

0.15***

0.11***

0.19***

[0.09,0.22]

[0.07,0.14]

[0.13,0.26]

0.17***

0.16***

0.27***

[0.05,0.29]

[0.07,0.24]

[0.17,0.37]

0.22***

0.15***

0.29***

[0.17,0.28]

[0.12,0.19]

[0.22,0.36]

0.09

0.07

0.09

[-0.04,0.21]

[-0.04,0.17]

[-0.06,0.24]

-0.01

-0.01

-0.05

[-0.14,0.11]

[-0.10,0.07]

[-0.21,0.11]

0.22***

0.17***

0.20***

[0.13,0.30]

[0.11,0.23]

[0.08,0.32]

0.11***

0.13***

0.13***

[0.07,0.16]

[0.08,0.18]

[0.09,0.17]

0.15***

0.10***

0.20***

[0.04,0.26]

[0.06,0.13]

[0.08,0.32]

0.39***

0.35***

0.44***

[0.28,0.50]

[0.24,0.45]

[0.26,0.62]

0.34***

0.27***

0.40***

[0.17,0.50]

[0.16,0.37]

[0.21,0.59]

0.48***

0.35***

0.63***

[0.33,0.63]

[0.27,0.44]

[0.46,0.80]

0.50***

0.38***

0.67***

[0.35,0.66]

[0.30,0.47]

[0.47,0.87]

0.78***

0.58***

0.92***

[0.65,0.91]

[0.49,0.67]

[0.78,1.06]

-1.07**

-0.3

-3.18***

[-2.02,-0.13]

[-0.95,0.35]

[-4.48,-1.88]

-4.07***

-2.32***

-6.72***

[-4.83,-3.31]

[-2.83,-1.80]

[-7.67,-5.78]

0.12***

0.10***

0.14***

48

Senate Ideology

[0.04,0.20]

[0.05,0.16]

[0.05,0.22]

0.14***

0.13***

0.16***

[0.07,0.20]

[0.08,0.17]

[0.06,0.26]

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
fixed effects model with clustered standard errors, one-year lag

+
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